:: That which is so in essence ::

From Shields' book, The Virtual:

The space of metaxis (is) the operation of the imagination which connects the perceptual environment with the virtual and abstract world of meanings which over-code our perceptions [p.39].

...Techniques of the virtual create the illusion of presence through props, simulations, partial presences (such as a voice conveyed by a telephone or thoughts written in a book) and rituals which evoke the past and make absent others present. They aid metaxis from the virtual to the actual by giving concrete presence to intangible ideas [p.41].

...The virtual is ideal, but abstract, real but not actual...The roots of the virtual (are) in the everyday mental ability to accept the 'almost so' in place of the actually so. Metaxis (is therefore) the ability to imaginatively close up the gap...[p.43]

Later on in the summary of this chapter of the book, Shields makes an argument for recontextualizing the polarized argument between what is virtual and what is real into an examination of the difference between what is virtual and what is concrete. This is an important argument, I think. More people need to understand it, for while it seems obvious when you read it, too many seem to feel that if it isn't concrete, it can't be real -- a sophistic assertion, in my opinion and seemingly also in Shield's.

Thus does Shield make the argument for a definition of the virtual as "that which is so in essence", a definition I accept and will use from herein.